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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 
NO. 222, Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
,V. S. HATCH COMPANY, 
A GTAH CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 
10943 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 222 
Appeal from Judgment of District Court of Davis County 
Judge Parley E. No1-seth, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a money judgment in favor 
of defendant-respondent pursuant to its counterclaim 
against the plaintiff-appellant. 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
This case was initiated by Teamsters Local Union 
No. 222 for and on behalf of Kendel S. Twitchell and 
other employees of defendant, W. S. Hatch Company, 
for the payment to such employees by the defendant 
of certain health and welfare and vacation benefits. 
Defendant counterclaimed against the Union seek-
ing recovery of $1567.50 which it claimed it had paid 
the Union in error because of an alleged unlawful de-
mand made to the Company by the Union. 
lly the time the matter came on for trial, all issues 
had been resolved between the parties except the 
Twitchell matter and defendant's counterclaim. The 
Trial Court entered judgment in favor of defendant 
Hatch on the Twitchell issue, and the plaintiff did 
not appeal that decision. The lower court also held in 
favor of the defendant and counterclaimant and against 
plaintiff on the issues raised in the counterclaim, and 
rendered judgment against plaintiff in the sum of 
$1567.50. As to this part of the judgment, plaintiff 
appeals, following a denial of its motion for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 16, 1961, the parties to th~ 
suit entered into a collective bargaining agreement 
which provided in Article XX, Section 2, that: 
"Effective October l, 1961, the Company shall 
contribute to a jointly administered trust fund 
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the sum of $16.50 per month for each regular 
employee covered by this agreement who has 
worked eighty ( 80) hours or more in the pre-
ceding month and thereafter shall continue to 
pay $16.50 for each such employee who works 
eighty ( 80) hours or more during each preced-
ing month for the duration of this agreement." 
Article XXXI of the agreement reads: 
"This agreement shall be effective October 
16, 1961 to September 30, 1964 * * * *" 
Prior to the agreement, the parties had entered 
into similar agreements, the last of which had termi-
ua ted June 30, 1961, during which tiine Hatch had 
paid $11.88 per month for each employee. The par-
ticular Trust Fund to which the money was contributed 
was the Utah-Idaho Teamsters Security Fund, a Trust 
jointly and equally administered by Management and 
Labor representatives. Hatch had made health and 
welfare contributions to this Trust Fund pursuant to 
these prior agreements, and had also made payments 
into the Trust for the benefit of its employees during 
periods when there were no such agreements, for ex-
ample, the period between June 30, 1961 and October 
1, 1961. During this particular interim period between 
agreements, Hatch paid an amount required by the 
terms of the agreement then recently expired. The 
Trust accepted the contributions, and the employees 
were made eligible and enjoyed the benefits therefrom, 
eyeu though there was no collective bargaining agree-
ment to support such payments. 
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At the conclusion of each calendar month, Hatch 
determined which of its employees had worked the 
required number of hours and then sent the appropriate 
sum of money to the Trust Fund for each such eligible 
employee. The employees were then given proper eli-
gibility and insurance coverage for the month immedi· 
ately following the month that the employees worked. 
It was impossible, of course, to determine the hours 
worked during any given month until the end of that 
month. 
Defendant's Exhibit 1 is a series of 36 checks, 
beginning with a check dated October 9, 1961, in the 
sum of $1152.36 and ending with a check dated Sep-
tember 14, 1964, in the sum of $1584.00. The fourth 
check in this series of 36 checks is dated January 15, 
1962, in the sum of $1094.94. This check was an adjust-
ment check which supplemented payments for the pre-
vious months. Prior to the October 16, 1961 agreement 
Hatch had been paying under the old rate of $11.88 
per employee per month. Under the new contract, the 
rate was $16.50 per month. This fourth check was an 
adjustment payment that paid up the difference be-
tween the old and the new rates. (Tr. 70-72). w·hen 
defendant introduced Exhibit 1, it failed to include 
in the exhibit the January payment for December, 
1961 hours, and, by mistake, substituted the said adjust-
ment check. The check that should have been included 
as the fourth payment was in the sum of $807.64. 
(Tr. 72). 
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wing is a list of checks contributed by 
l'rust Fund for hours worked since Sep-
n. This list includes all the checks in 
.xhibit 1 plus the $807.64 check above 
:ck 4 below) , and adds the check marked 
~xhibit 4 (see check 37 below). 
Date of Amount of Month of 
Check Check Eligibility and Benefits 
10-9-()1 $1152.36 Oct. 61 
11-15-61 997.92 Nov. 61 
12-12-61 795.96 Dec. 61 
Jan. 62 807.84 Jan. 62 
Lent check dated Jan. 15, 1962 in sum of 
2-26-62 1469.16 Feb. 62 
;J-15-62 1204.50 March 62 
.J.-IG-62 1254.00 April 62 
5-17-62 1452.00 May62 
6-14-62 1468.50 June 62 
7-25-62 1600.50 July 62 
8-17-62 1534.50 Aug. 62 
9-17-62 1534.50 Sept. 62 
10-12-62 1452.00 Oct. 62 
11-14-62 1369.50 Nov. 62 
12-13-62 1254.00 Dec. 62 
1-10-63 1089.00 Jan.63 
2-13-63 1105.50 Feb. 63 
.'3-13-63 1188.00 March 63 
4;-11-63 1287.00 April 63 
5-15-63 1402.50 May63 
6-13-63 1534.50 June 63 
7-16-6.'3 1534.50 July 63 
R-12-613 1485.00 Aug. 63 
0-13-63 1353.00 Sept. 63 
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Month of Date of Amount of Month of 
Hours Worked Check Check Eligibility 
and Benefits 
~5. Sept. 63 10-11-63 1287.00 Oct. 63 
:.w. Oct. 63 11-9-63 1221.00 Nov. 63 
'l.7. Nov. 63 11-29-63 1171.50 Dec. 63 
28. Dec. 63 1-1-64 1171.50 Jan. 64 
~9. Jan. 64 2-3-64 1270.50 Feb. 64 
30. Feb. 64 3-27-64 1105.50 Mar.64 
31. Mar. 64 .J.-23-64 1301.85 Apr. 64 
32. Apr. 64 5-27-64 1965.15 May64 
33. May 64 7-10-64 1452.00 June 64 
34. June 64 8-10-64 1617.00 July 64 
; ;5. July 64 8-14-64 1567.50 Aug. 64 
:J6. Aug. 64 9-14-64 1584.00 Sept. 64 
37. Sept. 64 12-19-64 1567.50 Oct. 64 
The payment by Hatch of the 37th check above 
in the sum of $1567.50 was not paid to appellant, Local 
No. 222, but was paid to the Utah-Idaho Teamsters 
Security Fund, and such payment was the basis for 
Hatch's counterclaim against appellant. The counter· 
claim was filed on or about June 11, 1965, a period of 
six months after it was paid to the Trust Fund, durin,q 
which time the Trust Fund furnished health and wel· 
fare benefits to Hatch' s employees for sickness they 
and their families suffered in October, 1964. These 
October benefits were made available to them as a 
result of Hatch's making such payment. (Tr. 87-88, 
90-91). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PAYl\IENT OF $1567.50 BY RESPOND-
J<~NT, HATCH CO., TO THE UTAH-IDAHO 
TEAMSTERS SECURITY F'UND VV AS A 
LA\VFUL PAYl\'IENT PURSUANT TO A 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT. 
As support of the judgment herein, the trial court 
made a finding that "Teamsters Local Union No. 222 
made an unlawful demand for contributions under 
the health and welfare provisions of said labor agree-
meut covering payment for the month of October, 
rnfi:3, a month not covered by said labor agreement," 
~d;d that "on or about December 19, 1964, defendant 
made payment of $1567.50 to said plaintiff pursuant 
to said demand." 
The court's finding that contributions of $1567.50 
paid December 19, 1964, were for the month of October 
(loes not enlighten us as to whether it refers to hours 
worked in October or to benefits received in October. 
We submit that its finding that the contribution of 
~1567.50 was pursuant to an unlawful demand is a 
condusion of law rather than a finding of fact because 
it is based on the court's interpretation of the language 
of Article XX, Section 2 of the agreement. If it is 
a finding of fact it is not supported by any evidence, 
because the evidence is that this payment was for hours 
Worked by the employees in September 1964. (Tr. 92). 
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Both parties to this law suit appear to agree that 
the Agreement meant that the new rate of $16.50 per 
month (the previous rate had been $11.88 per month) 
was to apply to hours worked in September, 1961. 
Thus, after the hours worked in September, 1961 were 
counted, the company then determined how many men 
had worked eighty (80) hours in September, 1961, 
and under the new Agreement "effective October 1, 
1961", paid $16.50 for each such employee covered by 
the Agreement, and such employees were then eligible 
for benefits beginning October 1, 1961. 
The question now arises whether the hours worked 
by the men in September, 1964, are included in the 
agreement or excluded. The Agreement is effective 
"through September 30, 1964". 
According to the interpretation of the language 
of the Agreement by the trial court, the employees 
were not entitled to health and welfare benefits for 
hours they worked in September, 1964, the theory being 
that health and welfare benefits under the Agreement 
are necessarily limited to a period of 36 months. 
The Agreement, however, does not speak in terms11) 
of months, but in terms of dates. The previous Agree-
ment between the parties had expired June 30, 1961, 
and the parties had been negotiating without a success· 
ful conclusion until October 16, 1961, a period of 31/z 
months. 
It seems to us that the rules of construction and 
interpretation are violated to read into the dates set 
8 
• 
forth in the Agreement a limit of 36 months when 
to do so deprives the employees of a most important 
fringe benefit for them and their families for hours that 
they worked in September, 1964, a month specifically 
included in the Agreement. Such a view holds that 
because the employees had health and welfare benefits 
in October, 1961, they were precluded from such bene-
fits in October, 1964, for hours worked in September, 
1964 simply because they would thus get benefits for 
37 months under the agreement rather than 36 months. 
\Ve believe that the Agreement does not so read, that 
the language that the "agreement shall be effective 
"' * * through September 30, 1964", means that the 
men would receive all benefits under the contract, in-
cluding full credit for hours worked toward health and 
welfare benefits during September, 1964. 
There is nothing in the record or the language 
of the Agreement to justify the Trial Court's restric-
tive interpretation. On the contrary, during the interim 
period between contracts, a period of three and a half 
months, the Company continued, voluntarily, to pay 
health and welfare contributions into the Trust Fund. 
"Tith this in mind, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the language of the Agreement fairly expresses the 
view that the new rate of contribution under the new 
Agreement would be applied back to October 1, 1961 
for hours already worked in September 1961, even 
though the Agreement was not reached until October 
16, 1961. And that having so provided, it was not 
thereby intended to deprive the employees of health 
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and welfare benefits for hours they would work iu 
September, 1964 merely because the benefits and eli-
gibility faerefor would not be received until October , 
HHJ-li. The Agreement" in fact, refers to such a lay montl1 
zchen it spcai,-s of payments for hours worked "in the 
precediny month''. 
At the time the parties negotiated and executed 
the Agreement they, we may well believe, did not hare 
it in mind to deprive the employees of an important 
"fringe" benefit for hours they would work during 
the last month of the Agreement. 'fhe Record reveals 
that the employees who were the recipients of these 
benefits went on strike against the Respondent early 
in October, 1964. (Tr. 65). In view of which, it is not 
u11reasonable to conclude that the Respondent looked 
at the Agreement in a more restrictive light than there· 
tofore, and then developed a theory that the benefits 
were necessarily limited to a period of 36 months. "A 
contract, being construed, should be viewed prospec-
tively as the parties viewed it at the time of its execu-
tion, and not from a retrospective point of view". 17 
Am. Jur. 2d 624 (para. 240). 
Since the Agreement speaks iu terms of dates rather 
than in terms of numbers of months, and in terms that 
[i;'e cle2 r :ff•<l unambiguous to the effect that the em· 
ployees were to be giYen all contract benefits for hours 
~rnrked by them in September, 1964, we submit that 
there was no legal basis for an interpretation of the 
language by the- trial court contrary to its expressed 
meaning. 
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"As a general rule, where the terms of a writing 
are plain and unambiguous, there is no room for con-
struction, since the only office of judicial construction 
is to remove doubt and uncertainty". (17 Am. Jur. 
2d 625 (para. 241). 
POINT II 
EVEN IF THE PAYMENT REFERRED 
TO IN POINT I WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
AN AGREEMENT, IT WAS, NEVERTHE-
LESS, A LAWFUL AND VOLUNTARY PAY-
MENT FOR '¥HICH FULL BENEFITS 
YVERE RECEIVED. 
If there had not been a written agreement to sup-
port the final payment of $1567.50 as the respondent 
contends, it was, nevertheless, a lawful and voluntary 
payment even though pursuant to a demand letter, not 
made under protest, and for which full eligibility and 
benefits were received by Hatch's employees. (Tr. 90-
91). 
A "termination of a contract is nullified by the 
subsequent acceptance of benefits growing out of the 
contract". 17 Am. J ur. 2d 961 (para. 489) . Even if 
Hatch had paid the $1567.50 pursuant to a fraudulent 
inducement by Appellant, instead of a letter demand-
ing it to honor its contract obligations as was the case 
here, Hatch would not be permitted to rescind the 
transaction without first restoring the benefit it had 
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received therefrom. See Brennan v. National Equitable 
Investment Co., 247 N.Y. 486, 160 N.E. 924; Neet 
v. Holmes, 25 Cal. 2d 447, 154 P2d 854, 860. 
If Local Union 222 had been in error when it 
wrote the letter demanding: that Hatch make its final 
payment to the Trust Fund for September, 1964 hours 
worked, such an error or miscalculation gives rise to 
no legal or equitable rule or doctrine that would permit 
Hatch to make such payment, get full benefit there-
from, then receive the payment back. Yet, this is pre-
cisely the ruling that Hatch has obtained from the 
Trial Court in this case, and from which appellant is 
11ow seeking relief. 
POINT III 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST THE AP-
PELLANT IS IN ERROR BECAUSE IT IS 
BASED ON THE ERRONEOUS FACTUAL 
PRE.LUISE THAT THE RESPONDENT, ,V. S. 
HATCH COMP ANY, PAID THE $1567.50 TO 
THE APPELLANT, YVHEN, IN FACT, IT 
YVAS PAID TO THE UTAH-IDAHO TEAM· 
STERS SECURITY FUND. 
A material finding of fact upon which the judg-
ment of appellant is based is that "on or about De-
cember 19, 1964, defendant made payment of $1567.50 
to said plaintiff". 
The onlv evidence as to whom the $1567.50 was 
paid is that it was paid by Hatch to the Utah-Idaho 
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ity .Fund and not to the plaintiff-
ters Local Union No. 222. The said 
'rust administered by Trustees equally 
tanagement and labor and is a legal 
)arated from Local Union 222. The 
mployees of many employers in Utah 
1om the employees of W. S. Hatch 
nly a small part. Local 222 was not 
:he Trust. This Trust is a Trust set 
the requirements of Section 302 of 
1 Labor Management Relations Act 
les referred to as the Taft-Hartley 
provides criminal penalties for em-
money to a representative of any of 
Local 222 was such a representative 
,s precluded from receiving the $1,-
iintly managed trusts are authorized 
::> that it is lawful for an employer to 
mch trusts for certain beneficial uses 
loyees and thereby not be in violation 
law proscribing such payments to a 
fact that the payment of the $1567.50 
tployer Hatch directly to the Trust 
:nefit of its employees (defendant's 
id Tr. 64) , and there is no evidence 
md in spite of the fact that had such 
ade to appellant, Teamsters Local 
re placed Hatch in criminal violation 
ti Statute, the trial court, nevertheless, 
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made the material finding of fact that "on or about 
December 19, 1964, defendant made payment to plain-
tiff [Teamsters Local 222] * * * *". 
Since the Union was a party to the collective bar-
gaining agreement that provided that Hatch make 
contributions into the Trust Fund for the benefit of 
Hatch's employees, the Trial Court may have mis-
understood the Union's role as an advocate for Hatch's 
employees when it wrote the letter demanding final 
payment by Hatch to the Trust, and when it defended 
the counterclaim of Hatch against the Union on the 
issue of the validity of the final payment to the Trust. 
If Hatch wanted a judgment for the return of the 
money it paid to the Trust, it was essential that Hatch 
bring the Trust into court as a third party defendant 
when it counterclaimed. During the trial it was suggest-
ed by Hatch that it was appellant's obligation to bring 
the Trust in as a party. But appellant wasn't seeking 
anything from the Trust. Hatch was after money it 
had paid the Trust and it was therefore Hatch's re· 
sponsibility to bring into court as parties whomever 
it needed to perfect its case, if it had one. 
But the fact is that the Trust, not the union, re· 
ceived the payment in question, and the Trial Court's 
finding to the contrary is clearly a factual error with· 
out any evidentiary support whatsoever. Even if ap· 
pellant were not fortified by its Points I and II here· 
in, any judgment in favor of Hatch must necessarily 
be against the proper party, the one who received the 
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money. On this point alone the judgment against the 
appellant should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment against appellant is in error be-
cause the payment of $1567.50 to the Utah-Idaho 
Teamsters Security Fund was pursuant to the written 
collective bargaining agreement of October 16, 1961; 
it was a payment, whether paid under a written agree-
ment or not, for which respondent obtained full value; 
and because even if respondent's counterclaim had any 
substantive merit, appellant did not receive the money, 
and it is not the party against whom such a claim should 
be made, nor a judgment rendered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PARK SMOOT 
Attorney for Appellant 
847 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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